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Abstract 
This study explores the dark side of transparency by problematizing the Nigeria Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) as a transparency, accountability and anti-
corruption initiative in Nigeria. It does this by interrogating the underlying assumptions that 
transparency in the form of increased information disclosure inevitably leads to enhanced 
accountability and reduced corruption. Theoretic insights are drawn from the transparency 
literature as well as from the International Accounting Standards Board’s framework for 
financial reporting.  The findings enable a more nuanced understanding of transparency – 
where and when transparency works, and where and when it may lead to unintended 
outcomes. They show how increased information disclosure conceals and legitimises the 
weak and corrupt reporting systems and practices of government agencies. They highlight the 
importance of understandability of information disclosed as a key requirement of 
transparency. They illustrate that transparency is a complex social process by highlighting the 
means by which the government tries to gain control of the NEITI organisation and how 
NEITI’s ability to operate effectively is dependent on the political will of the government in 
power. The findings also demonstrate that the instrument through which transparency is 
enacted is itself a central actor in the transparency process as historical corruption within the 
NEITI bureaucracy as well as the opacity of NEITI as an organisation lead to outcomes of 
distrust, uncertainty and doubt amongst NEITIs target audience.  
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The dark side of transparency: Does the Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative help or hinder accountability and corruption control? 
 
“Global EITI is held hostage by Nigeria – how can you criticize 
Nigeria when it is your flagship project? The Revenue Watch 
guide for civil society on how to do EITI, written by Glodwyn and 
Chris Nurse, was overflowing with Nigeria EITI stuff. Peter 
Eigen said the investment climate in Nigeria has improved 
dramatically, but the problem is that it is not that golden now. 
EITI should try not to mention Nigeria so much… it’s like they 
are telling other countries ‘you should try and be as transparent 
as Nigeria’. Is that really such a good idea? – Shaxson (2009) 
 
There is an assumption behind EITI as a whole that if you 
manage your resources in a more transparent way, that will lead 
to more accountability and that will lead to better governance 
and more prosperity for the citizens. The assumptions should be 
interrogated. The linkages are not automatic…. We should be 
asking ourselves, despite all we have achieved, how much do the 
people know about this sector and with what they know are they 
asking the right questions? – Waziri Adio, Executive Secretary, 




The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a multi-stakeholder governance 
approach that brings together resource-rich developing countries, companies operating in the 
extractive industries, investor associations and civil society organisations. While the ideas 
underlying the EITI were outlined in 2002 by Tony Blair, the then Prime Minister of the UK, 
it was not until June 2003 that some 140 delegates representing 70 governments, companies, 
industry groups, international organisations, investors and NGOs gathered in London to agree 
the EITI Statement of Principles (EITI, 2016a). The 12 principles agreed centered on the need 
for transparency in the management of natural resources. In November 2003, Olusegun 
Obasanjo, the then Nigerian President, committed to EITI and the Nigeria EITI (NEITI) was 
launched in February 2004 as a significant part of the transparency and anti-corruption 
reforms which his government was initiating (NEITI, 2016). Since adopting EITI, Nigeria 
has made some progress in terms of enhanced information disclosure in the extractive 
industry and has been held out by the Global EITI as being one of the most successful 
implementers of the EITI Standard (Eigen, 2006; Haufler, 2010; Shaxson, 2009). 
Underlying the EITI project and its adoption in Nigeria is the assumption that transparency in 
the form of increased information disclosure by the government and companies in the 
extractive industries will empower citizens to hold them to account thus improving 
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accountability and reducing corruption (Oge, 2017). A stream of research on EITI has sought 
to validate this assumption empirically with mixed results. Some studies show that adoption 
of EITI leads to greater corruption control (Kasekende et al., 2016; David-Barrett and 
Okamura, 2013) while others refute this link (Sovacool et al., 2016; Oge, 2016; Sovacool and 
Andrews, 2015; Corrigan, 2014). Studies focused on Nigeria highlight a perception of 
increased transparency and its role as a tool to drive enhanced accountability and control of 
corruption (Bature, 2014; Rotimi and Abdul-Azeez, 2013; Ocheni and Nwankwo, 2012). 
We take a different and more critical approach to the adoption of EITI in Nigeria by seeking 
to problematise NEITI as a public sector transparency, accountability and anti-corruption 
initiative in Nigeria. We ‘interrogate’ the underlying assumptions that increased information 
disclosure equates transparency and that transparency in this form can improve accountability 
and reduce corruption. In doing this we draw on insights from the critical transparency 
literature (Tsoukas, 1997; Strathern, 2000; Ball, 2009; Meijer, 2013; Fenster, 2005, 2015) as 
well as from the International Accounting Standards Boards (IASB) Conceptual Framework 
for Financial Reporting (IASB, 2010).  
We show that for information disclosed through NEITI audit reports to be used effectively by 
its target audience, the information disclosed needs to be timely, understandable and 
faithfully represent the phenomena which it claims to represent. When the audit reports do 
not display these characteristics, they are largely ignored by civil society and the public 
unless they are reminded of the availability of this information and directed on how the 
information can be used to shape public debate. 
Our findings contribute to the transparency and EITI literature (Albu and Flyverbom, 2016; 
Bature, 2014; Bushman, Chen, Engel, and Smith, 2004; Christensen and Langer, 2009; 
Eijffinger and Geraats, 2006; Fenster, 2005, 2015; Meijer, 2014; Öge, 2017; Tsoukas, 1997) 
in a number of ways. First, we contribute by showing how viewing transparency as increased 
information disclosure without regard to how the information was produced has led to 
unintended consequence. This is done by highlighting how increased information disclosure 
has served as a means of legitimising the weak and corrupt reporting systems and practices of 
government agencies which provide NEITI with the information on which it bases its audit 
report. Second, we contribute by highlighting the importance of understandability of 
information disclosed as a key requirement of transparency. This is done by showing how 
NEITI audit reports are ignored by their target audience because they are largely 
unintelligible. Third, we illustrate the complexity of transparency as a social process by 
highlighting the means by which the government tries to gain control of the NEITI 
organisation and how NEITI’s ability to operate effectively is dependent on the political will 
of the government in power. Fourth, we contribute by demonstrating that the instrument 
through which transparency is enacted is itself a central actor in the transparency process. We 
do this by showing how historical corruption within the NEITI bureaucracy as well as the 
opacity of NEITI as an organisation lead to outcomes of distrust, uncertainty and doubt 
amongst NEITIs target audience. These contributions enable a more nuanced understanding 
of transparency – where and when transparency works, and where and when it may lead to 
unintended outcomes. Indeed, they enable us better understand the darker side of 




The rest of this paper consists of seven major sections. Section 2 sets the scene for the study 
by providing background information on the Nigerian context, EITIs adoption in Nigeria and 
NEITI. In Section 3, we develop the theoretical frame for the study by highlighting insights 
from the transparency literature and the IASB Conceptual Framework for Financial 
Reporting. Section 4 explains the methodological approach adopted while Section 5 
highlights the major findings of the study. The last two sections discuss the findings and 




2.1 The Nigerian Context 
Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa and was the world's fourth-largest exporter of 
liquified natural gas in 2015 (US Energy Information Administration, 2016). It accounts for 
1.1% of global gas production and holds 29% of Africa’s proven oil reserves (EITI, 2016b). 
While Nigeria also has mineral resources such as coal, tin, iron ore, limestone and gold, the 
mineral sector is largely constituted of artisanal and small-scale mining operations, and most 
of the major mining projects are at the exploration stage.  Thus, the extractive sector is 
dominated by oil and gas production which accounts for 99% of extractive sector total 
revenue (EITI, 2016b).  
The oil and gas industries are the mainstay of the Nigerian economy and typically account for 
about 80% of total fiscal revenue to the government (public sector revenue), about 90-95% of 
export revenue and 30-35% of GDP (Shaxson, 2009). The most significant revenue streams 
from the oil and gas industry are petroleum profit tax, royalties and dividends. The Nigerian 
government participates in the oil and gas industries through the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC), a state-owned corporation, and its various subsidiaries. Oil production 
in Nigeria is dominated by six Joint Venture arrangements which account for 88.6% of all 
oil-specific taxes, the government through the NNPC controls between 55%-60% of each of 
these Joint Ventures. 
Despite Nigeria’s vast oil wealth and its status as Africa leading oil producer, it is ranked 152 
(out of 188 countries) on the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) 2016 
Human Development Index, falling into the category of ‘low human development’ (UNDP, 
2016). Nigeria was ranked 122 out of 180 countries in the 2017 Press Freedom Index which 
measures press freedom, an essential component of transparency, (Reporters Without 
Borders, 2017). Nigeria is ranked 136 out of 174 countries on Transparency International’s 
2016 Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International, 2017) with a score of 28 out 
of 100 (where 0 is perceived as ‘highly corrupt’ and 100 ‘very clean’). 
It is against this backdrop that the Nigerian government committed to the EITI Standard in a 
bid to fight corruption and reverse the resource curse. So, what then is the EITI Standard? 
 
 
2.2 EITI and its adoption in Nigeria 
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The EITI is a global standard aimed at instituting good governance in the oil, gas and mineral 
resources industries. Advocates of the EITI argue that when implemented by a country, it 
should ensure transparency and accountability regarding how a country's natural resources 
are governed (World Bank, 2008). Countries intending to implement the EITI standard 
commit themselves to the 12 EITI principles (see Appendix 1) agreed at the London 
Conference in 2003 and make a formal application to the EITI. These principles are 
operationalised through a set of requirements which implementing countries are obliged to 
adhere to (see Appendix 2). The EITI requirements are considered a minimum threshold and 
implementing countries are encouraged to go beyond this minimum threshold.  
Nigeria was the first country in the world to formally declare its intention to implement the 
global EITI framework and the Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiate (NEITI) 
was officially launched by then President Olusegun Obasanjo in 2004 to implement the 
global EITI framework (Eigen, 2006). Indeed, Nigeria is considered a flagship in global EITI 
implementation as the NEITI agenda far surpassed the global EITI standard. Highlighting this 
in his testimony before the United States Congress, David Goldwyn notes: 
“The NEITI process, launched in 2004, is the most comprehensive 
transparency program ever attempted under EITI auspices …  NEITI 
set goals far beyond the basic EITI principles of revenue disclosure. 
Nigerians had little confidence in the integrity of any of the actors in 
the oil and gas value chain. It was essential to … examine and audit the 
quantity of oil and gas lifted from well head to fiscalization, to track the 
money paid for the oil and gas from first sales to recordation in the 
Central Bank, to verify that all taxes and royalties and payments of any 
kind had been paid in full and deposited in the Central Bank, and to 
examine every major process from licensing to refining. The audits 
looked deep into the conduct and practices of the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN), the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), the Federal Inland 
Revenue Service (FIRS) and many other government agencies.” 
(Goldwyn, 2006) 
In setting such a wide remit of conducting not just a financial audit as required by EITI but 
also conducting physical and process audits, NEITI set itself up as a significant player in the 
extractive industry regulatory space, a key driver of transparency in the Nigerian extractive 
industry and a critical part of the Nigerian governments anti-corruption reforms (Shaxson, 
2009; Goldwyn, 2006). This position was legitimised and strengthened by the passing in 
2007 of the NEITI Act which gave the NEITI organisation legal status and powers. This new 
status allowed it to develop an organisation structure which includes a secretariat with about 
55 staff led by an Executive Secretary and overseen by a National Stakeholder Working 
Group (NSWG). Appendix 3 outlines major actors in the NEITI process. 
Thus, NEITI’s key role is to drive transparency in the Nigerian extractive industry. But, how 
should we understand transparency? To explore this question we theorise the conception of 
transparency in the next section.  
3 Theorising Transparency 
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Transparency has a long history as a foundational principle for public management and 
governance (Hood, 2007; Ball, 2009). In the social sciences, it is usually seen as a powerful 
means towards achieving some desirable social ends like enhancing accountability and 
reducing corruption (Hansen et al., 2015). However, there is little consensus as to what 
transparency is with various definitions and conceptualisations of transparency being 
advanced. Two overarching conceptions of transparency are identified by Albu and 
Flyverbom (2016) in their review of the transparency literature. The first conceptualisation 
focuses on the role of information and characterises transparency as the increased disclosure 
of information. The second conceptualisation of transparency is as a complex 
communicative, organisational, social process rife with tensions and negotiations. While 
previous studies have drawn on one or the other conceptualisation of transparency, we draw 
insights from both conceptualisations in framing our study. 
3.1 Transparency as Information Disclosure 
Popular definitions of transparency define it is as ‘lifting the veil of secrecy’ (Davis, 1998, pp. 
121) or ‘the ability to look clearly through the window of an institution’ (Den Boer, 1998, pp. 
105). Here transparency shines light into the darkness, making the invisible visible and 
‘disinfecting’ the state of unaccountability and corruption (Etzioni, 2010). Indeed, 
transparency is often understood through metaphors like ‘sunlight’, ‘disinfectant’ or 
‘window’ (Tsoukas, 1997; Den Boer, 1998; Etzioni, 2010) and construed as the counterpoint 
to secrecy and opacity. 
How then is the veil lifted, or the window opened or the light shone? Several authors, 
commenting on the ‘information society’, argue that transparency in this sense is solely 
dependent on and equivalent to, increased information disclosure (Bushman et al., 2004; 
Eijffinger and Geraats, 2006; Wehmeier and Raaz, 2012). Indeed, Berglund (2014, pp. 360) 
notes: 
“…transparency will thus require full disclosure of all relevant 
information in a timely manner” 
Underlying this conception of transparency as information disclosure is a linear 
communication model which posits three things (Fenster, 2015). First, that some actors 
(usually the state, but in our case, the state and the extractive industry companies) produce 
information which they control and can be forced to release. Second, the information 
produced by these actors constitutes a message that can be isolated and disclosed. Third, there 
is a public waiting for the disclosure of this information which is willing and able to act on it 
(Fenster, 2005, 2015). This model is illustrated in the definition of transparency by Meijer 
(2013, pp. 430): 
Transparency can be defined as the availability of information about 
an actor allowing other actors to monitor the workings or 
performance of this actor. 
This conception of transparency presupposes that the information put in the public domain is 
useful information and that the public and civil society have the capacity to use this 
information to monitor the state and corporations (Oge, 2017). Thus, this stream of literature 
leads us to focus our attention on the capacity of the public and civil society to use the 
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information put in the public domain as well as to ask: is the information put in the public 
domain by the Nigerian state, extractive industry companies and NEITI useful?  
While ‘usefulness of information’ is presupposed, there is no discussion in the literature as to 
what it means for information to be useful beyond Berglund’s (2014) assertion that 
information should be relevant, timely and fully disclosed. Consequently, we draw insights 
from the IASB’s Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting (IASB, 2010) as well as the 
accounting literature to develop our understanding of what useful information is. The IASB’s 
Conceptual Framework sets out a number of qualitative characteristics which useful 
information should have. These characteristics include faithful representation, timeliness and 
understandability. 
Faithful representation emphasises the need for the information presented to represent 
faithfully the phenomena it purports to represent. It implies underlying characteristics of 
completeness, neutrality and freedom from error. While the conceptual framework 
emphasises the need for financial information to faithfully represent the underlying reality, 
the accounting literature shows that in several cases, financial information disclosed is 
manipulated so as to present a misleading representation to the information users (Rezaee, 
2005). Strategies for creating these misleading representations and deceptions in financial 
statements are identified by Johnson et al. (2001, 1993) as: masking1, dazzling2, decoying3, 
repackaging4, mimicking5, and double play6. An audit serves as a deterrent to these 
deceptions, misleading representations and fraud (Rezaee, 2005; Wells, 2002). Indeed, 
Maines and Wahlen (2006) argue that an unqualified audit report is a necessary precondition 
for users to perceive financial information as reliable and faithfully represented. 
Timeliness means that information is available to decision-makers in time to be capable of 
influencing their decisions and understandability implies that information is presented 
clearly, concisely and in a manner that makes it understandable to the users. Indeed, Biondi 
and Lapsley (2014) argue that a higher level of transparency is achieved when there is a 
genuine level of understanding of the phenomenon disclosed and an even higher transparency 
level is achieved when a sophisticated level of understanding which extends to shared 
meanings is held by parties interested in the disclosed phenomenon. 
Scholars adopting this understanding of transparency argue that increased disclosure of useful 
information leads to better governance, improved accountability, reduced corruption and 
enhanced trust (Hood, 2006; Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000; Finel and Lord, 1999; Wehmeier 















3.2 Transparency as a Social Process 
Critical transparency scholars argue that transparency is better understood as a social process 
which includes components such as the subjects, material objects and settings. Albu and 
Flyverbom (2016) explain: 
“transparency is a process that includes the following components: 
subjects which are involved in politically motivated interpretations 
and enactments of transparency… material objects at work in 
transparency projects that actively mediate and manage its resulting 
visibilities…. and settings which are the loci of transparency 
projects….” (Albu and Flyverbom, 2016 pp. 10) 
While all of these components are extremely complex and inextricably interwoven, the 
communication model of transparency provides a useful starting point to analyse the 
dynamics of the transparency process. This model enables an understanding of  transparency 
as an institutional relationship between the state and the public which can be analysed in 
terms of rules, interactions, power, context, etc. (Meijer, 2013; Flyverbom et al., 2011). 
Indeed, Derrida highlights the role that communication plays in establishing complex 
relations between actors thus: 
When I say something to someone, it is not certain that my major 
preoccupation is to transmit knowledge or meaning; it is rather to 
enter into a certain type of relation with the other person, to attempt 
to seduce him or her, or give him or her something, or even to wage 
war. Thus, beyond the schemas of communication appear other 
possible finalities. (quoted in Mattelart and Mattelart, 1992, pp. 47) 
In such complex processes, conflict and negotiation are inevitable as subjects make decisions 
on what should be made visible and what should not (Albu, 2014; Thedvall, 2008) and as 
their cultural and political inclinations clash (Klintman and Bostrom, 2008). The conflicts, 
negotiations and inevitable compromises in the transparency process highlight the 
uncertainties, paradoxes and negative consequences which come along with increased 
disclosure of information. Indeed, Tsoukas (1997) warns: 
“…the information society is a society full of temptations: it tempts us 
into thinking that our modern desires of transparency and societal 
regulation will be realized through greater knowledge. But not any kind 
of knowledge will do; only knowledge conceived as information…is 
seen as useful. This tantalizing dream, however, …is bound to remain 
unfulfilled. Like Tantalus, the members of the information society, much 
as they desire it, will not be able to taste the fruits of higher 
transparency: society will remain as opaque as it has always been and, 
in some ways, it will become more unfathomable as well as 
unmanageable. The information society spawns paradoxes that prevent 
it from satisfying the temptations it creates. The light that the 
information society promises to direct upon itself may well constitute a 




Exploring the unintended consequences of increased information disclosure, Strathern (2000) 
argues that by shining light on certain issues, by making them visible, we conceal other issues 
in darkness. She argues that the question to researchers should then become ‘what does 
visibility conceal?’ (Strathern, 2000 pp. 310). Other unintended consequences include the 
undermining of trust (Tsoukas, 1997; Eisenberg, 2007), growing uncertainty or suspicion vis-
a`-vis institutions and the people working in them (Strathern, 2000) and the emergence of 
new types of closure, self-censorship and anxiety (Christensen and Langer, 2009). Insights 
from this stream of literature lead us to ask: ‘what does visibility conceal i.e. What does the 
information disclosed by the Nigerian state, extractive industry companies and NEITI 
conceal?’; ‘what are the institutional relations which shape information disclosure and the 
use of disclosed information?’ and ‘what are the unintended consequences of putting 
information in the public domain by the state, extractive industry companies and NEITI?’  
From the foregone we come to the following conclusions: 
i. Transparency entails shining light on objects and making them visible. However, in 
making the invisible visible, it conceals other things. 
ii. Transparency can be viewed as a process and as comprising institutional relations 
which can be analysed in terms of subjects, setting, rules, interactions, power, etc. 
iii. Transparency is seen as information disclosure. However, the information disclosed 
has to be useful and the public and civil society have to be able to use the information 
disclosed. 
iv. Transparency can have unintended consequences. 
 
4 Methods 
We set out to problematize NEITI as a transparency and anti-corruption initiative in Nigeria 
by challenging the underlying assumption of transparency as information disclosure and its 
link with accountability and corruption in Nigeria. Following the methodological traditions of 
sociohistorical research (Brivati et al., 1996) as well as critical accounting research (McPhail 
et al., 2016; Sikka and Willmott, 2010;  Haynes, 2010) we draw on a range of secondary data 
sources which include NEITI audit reports , documents relating to the development and 
implementation of the global EITI framework, NEITI press releases and communications, all 
NEITI documents publicly available on their website, Chatham House and other civil society 
reports on NEITI, media reports on NEITI and the Nigerian extractive industry, KPMG and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers forensic investigation reports on NNPC and US Embassy in Nigeria 
cable communication obtained from WikiLeaks. We also draw on audio and written 
transcripts of legislative hearings and proceedings related to NEITI as well as video 
recordings of press interviews given by NEITI officials. We had also sought to obtain 
interviews from NEITI officials and board members. However, our requests were declined 
with the NEITI officials and board members citing confidentiality agreements which 
prevented them from granting interviews. Appendices 4 and 5 give details of data sources. 
The data collected was analysed qualitatively with the aim of understanding the workings of 
NEITI as a transparency and anti-corruption initiative. Figure 1 sets out the analytic process 




Figure 1: The Analytic Process 
 
We began our analysis by familiarising ourselves with the data. This was done through an 
iterative cycle of reviewing the data, reflecting and re-reviewing the data. As we reviewed the 
data iteratively, we were constantly asking ourselves ‘what is going on here?’; ‘how useful is 
the information disclosed?’; ‘what does increased information disclosure conceal?’; what 
are the institutional relations which shape information disclosure and the use of disclosed 
information’ and ‘what are the unintended consequences of transparency?’.  This helped us 
develop a stream of reflective notes. We then started to sift the data, collating whatever 
seemed important and discarding the irrelevant. Our approach to the data was sensitised by 
our understanding of the theoretic concept of transparency detailed in the previous section. 
Thus, our understanding of the concept informed our approach to the data, directed us to 
areas of interest while not constraining out ability to develop novel insights (Anderson et al., 
2010). 
The next phase of our analysis was a search for patterns in the data. In searching for patterns, 
we employed the constant comparative method of analysis (Jack et al., 2010; Jack and 
Anderson 2002; Anderson and Jack, 2002). In this method, analysis is achieved through two 
main activities: fragmentation and comparison (Boeije, 2002). In our case, fragmentation was 
achieved through the open coding of individual documents. This allowed us to lift pieces of 
coded data out of the context of the whole document for comparison. Codes were compared 
at different levels e.g. within documents, between documents, within emergent categories and 
themes, between emergent categories and themes. Through this process of fragmentation and 
constant comparison, themes and categories started to emerge and be refined. Fragmentation 
and comparison also enabled us to triangulate data from the various sources. This enabled us 
gain a measure of confidence that the themes which emerged, and the interpretations 
developed subsequently, were well grounded in the data. The final stage involved a synthesis 
of the descriptive categories into analytic categories which give insight into the research 
question and enable the development of an explanatory frame. To do this we moved 
abductively between our empirical findings, theoretic concepts and the developing 
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explanatory frame in a reflective spiral. This allowed our sensemaking of our empirical 
results to be informed by theory while giving us the opportunity to develop new insights. 
Thus, over several iterations, elements of the explanatory frame were retained, revised, 
removed or added. 
The findings and explanatory frame developed are presented in the next section. 
5 Findings 
5.1 Usefulness of disclosed information 
In assessing the usefulness of the information disclosed, we draw on insights from the IASB 
Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting which highlights timeliness, 
understandability and faithful representation as qualitative characteristics of useful 
information (IASB, 2010).  
5.1.1 Timeliness 
Timeliness means having information available to users in time to be capable of influencing 
their decisions. Generally, the older the information is the less useful it is. While it is usual to 
have audit reports on an annual basis for corporations in the private and public sector, the 
EITI Standard allows for reports to be lagged for two years. This makes the reports less 
effective as they are less contemporaneous with events in the industry which move very fast. 
In addition to this, NEITIs reporting practice highlighted in Table 1 below indicates a time 
lag of between 2 and 5 years with only the 2013, 2014 and 2015 audit reports being produced 
within the EITI two year timeframe. 
Table 1: NEITI Reporting Practice 
Period Report Covers Date of 
Publication 
Lag 
2015 Dec 2017 2 years 
2014 Dec 2016 2 years 
2013 Sept 2015 2 years 
2012 March 2015 3 years 
2009 – 2011 Dec 2012 1 - 3 year 
2006 – 2008 July 2011 3 - 5 years 
2005 Oct 2008 3 years 
1999 – 2004 Aug 2006 Produced 
retrospectively 
 
Explaining the reasons for the delayed production of NEITI audit reports, its Executive 
Secretary comments: 
“It could be better because the more recent the reports are the more 
effective, the more impactful they will be….. the process of procuring 
the auditors takes a lot of time, the process of getting the public funding 
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to pay for the auditors also takes a lot of time” (Channels TV Interview 
A) 
Thus, while there is a recognition of the institutional factors and relations which NEITI needs 
to negotiate in order to produce its reports in a timely manner, there is also a recognition that 
reports need to be produced in a timely manner in order to be ‘effective’ and ‘impactful’ as 
the older the information, the less useful it is in driving accountability within the extractive 
industry. 
5.1.2 Understandability 
Both the IASB Conceptual Framework and the EITI Standard identify understandability to its  
target audience as a key characteristic of useful information. The EITI identifies its target 
audience as: 
“government, parliamentarians, civil society, companies and the 
media” (EITI Guidance Note 12) 
This target audience comprises a wide range of individuals and groups with varying skills and 
abilities. However, the NEITI reports are usually in highly technical language and are quite 
lengthy – most well between 100 and 400 pages long not including Appendices. The former 
Executive Secretary of NEITI comments on this: 
“In order to meet required international standards, the NEITI audit 
reports are usually presented in forms that are hardly digestible by 
majority of the target audience. They contain complex accounting 
jargons that would make little or no meaning to non-accountants. 
NEITI undertakes the task of simplifying the audits but the best of these 
simplified versions do not make great difference because of the need to 
avoid the risk of misinterpreting the original contents of the audits.” 
(Presentation by NEITI Executive Secretary to IMF Mission on 21 
March 2012) 
With the legislators, civil society and the public hardly able to understand the NEITI audit 
reports without the aid of specialist advisors, it comes as no surprise that these reports were 
largely ignored until scandals within the Nigerian oil industry brought them to light well over 
ten years after NEITI started producing these reports. This is highlighted in the former NEITI 
Chairman’s comments: 
“….issues of corruption revealed in the fuel subsidy probe by the 
National Assembly was the first time that Nigerians were made aware 
of the presence of huge reports that have been in the public domain 
already about the issues in the nation’s petroleum industry, which was 
produced by NEITI over the years.” (Onwuemenyi, 2012) 
Thus, as a result of the incomprehensibility of the NEITI audit reports to the 
majority of its audience, although in the public domain, they were not used by the 
public in driving accountability. It was a later scandal that brought issues on which 
NEITI reported to the fore of public debate and then NEITI officers highlighted the 
potential use their reports could be put to. 
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 5.1.3 Faithful Representation 
The IASB Conceptual Framework identifies faithful representation as a 
fundamental characteristic of useful information. It notes: 
“To be useful, financial information must not only represent relevant 
phenomena, but it must also faithfully represent the phenomena that it 
purports to represent ….. To be a perfectly faithful representation, a 
depiction would have three characteristics. It would be complete, 
neutral and free from error…. A complete depiction includes all 
information necessary for a user to understand the phenomenon being 
depicted, including all necessary descriptions and explanations.” 
(IASB, 2010 pp. 13) 
A careful reading of the NEITI audit reports highlights several issues where 
phenomena are not represented faithfully. While there are several issues which we 
could use as illustrations with, for brevity, we illustrate with the issue of oil theft 
reported within the NEITI audit reports. 
The 2016 NEITI oil and gas audit report states: 
“Crude oil losses is often associated with activities relating to the theft 
or sabotage of crude oil, facilities or installations in form of illegal 
bunkering, pipeline vandalism, fuel scooping, illegal refining and 
transport and oil terrorism.....Nigeria currently loses about $4 million 
daily to crude oil thieves” (NEITI 2016 oil and gas audit report, 
pp.220) 
The report goes on to give nine pages of precise data quantifying the amount of oil lost to 
theft as reported by the oil companies. While the audit report purports to give a 
comprehensive account of crude oil theft, in reality, it only accounts for theft of oil which 
occurs at the oil terminals and any subsequent point. Other aspects of oil theft are ignored by 
the audit reports creating an impression that this aspect of oil theft is immaterial and 
irrelevant. However, this is not the case. The US Consul General (ConGen) in Lagos 
highlights these other aspects of oil theft and their significance in the Nigerian context: 
“Oil can also be stolen without disruption to the legitimate flow of oil 
from the well-head to the tank farm and without the use of force - much 
less the messy business of "bunkering" the oil in the creeks. Such thefts 
occur when individuals fail to register portions of the oil delivered to 
and stored at official tank farms on the official accounts of the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation and, instead, sell such oil "under the 
counter" or "off book" for the account of one or more beneficiaries. 
Different contacts on various occasions told ConGen personnel that 
this method accounts for the largest volume of oil stolen in Nigeria and 
that the beneficiaries of this "creative accounting" involve people "very 





NEITI is well aware of this fact as this point is noted in discussions and comments outside 
the audit report.  Indeed, the document produced on NEITI staff reflections on 10 years of 
NEITI audit reports notes that: 
“The actual amount of oil produced in Nigeria is not known. Oil is 
measured at terminals but not at well-heads of flow stations. Around 
10% of oil is estimated to be lost or stolen between these points” (NEITI 
Report) 
The non-inclusion of this aspect of oil theft in the NEITI audit reports, given its 
importance and NEITI’s knowledge of its scope and significance, signals a 
departure from the principle that the information reported should be a faithful 
representation of the phenomenon which it claims to represent. Indeed, by 
unfaithfully representing oil theft and concealing a significant aspect of oil theft, 
NEITI helps to entrench the corrupt system which enables this theft to occur 
unnoticed and unreported. 
5.2 What does visibility conceal? 
NEITI seeks to promote transparency by making information which had previously been 
circulated amongst a small group in government and industry public and accessible. It does 
this by ensuring compliance with the EITI principles and requirements which compel the 
disclosure of information through NEITI audit reports. While these audit reports reveal a lot, 
we are interested in what they conceal. We find that one of the key things which the audit 
reports conceal is the reliability of the systems and structures which generate the information 
disclosed. The NEITI reports are based on data produced by the Nigerian public sector 
institutions and agencies (NNPC, DPR, Ministry of Finance, and Central Bank of Nigeria) as 
well as companies operating in the sector. This follows the approach recommended by the 
EITI Standard: 
“the standard …. encourages countries to build on their existing 
reporting systems and practices for EITI data collection, rather than 
burdening themselves by duplicating the process through EITI 
reporting. I am confident that this will make EITI data more timely, 
reliable and accessible, and the EITI process more cost effective and 
efficient” (EITI, 2016c) 
While the idea of piggy-backing on existing data collection and reporting systems and 
practices sounds like a good and cost effective one, it does not consider the social context in 
which these information collection and reporting systems are embedded. Indeed, in a country 
like Nigeria which has seen several decades of corruption, these systems are largely non-
existent and where they do exist they are so deeply rooted in the corrupt system that the data 
collected and the reports produced from this information is at best unreliable. The weakness 
of existing public sector accounting and reporting systems is highlighted by a 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) report of their forensic audit of NNPCs remittances into the 
Nigerian governments account thus: 
“…the accounting and reconciliation system for crude oil revenue used 
by Government agencies appear to be inaccurate and weak…..” (PwC,  
2015 pp. 18) 
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Indeed, the weakness of the accounting and reporting systems of public sector agencies is 
well known and has been documented severally. An insider in the Nigerian oil industry 
commenting on this notes: 
“there was simply no tradition of good record-keeping. As one insider 
put it, ‘The Central Government did not keep records on a computer. 
The tax authorities didn’t audit taxes. The royalty authorities didn’t 
audit royalties.’ There were major problems too at the Central Bank 
and the Accountant-General’s office, both of which did not keep good 
records.” (quoted in Shaxson, 2009 pp. 28) 
Beyond the systemic weaknesses is the system of ‘creative accounting’ noted in the 
discussion on oil theft above which has permeated the accounting and reporting systems of 
NNPC and other public sector agencies in the extractive industry. 
The inaccuracy and weakness of the accounts and reports which NEITI draws on in 
developing its audit reports is not acknowledged in the NEITI reports which instead claim to 
be based on the assumption that: 
“The data and/or information to be received from the covered entities 
are genuine and consistent” (NEITI 2013 Oil and Gas Audit Report, 
pp. 17). 
By ignoring the context in which the information underpinning the NEITI audit reports is 
generated and reported, NEITI has ended up in a position where the information used in its 
audit reports is at best unreliable. Publishing of this unreliable information through the NEITI 
reports serves to legitimise the system which produced it. As such, while NEITI has brought 
about transparency in the narrow sense of ‘information disclosure’, it has served to conceal, 
legitimise and entrench the corrupt systems and reinforce the lack of accountability in the 
system. 
 
5.3 The transparency process 
We find that the NEITI transparency process is impacted on by a range of factors which 
include the political will of the government in power, the involvement of civil society in the 
process and opacity of NEITI as an institution. 
5.3.1 Political will of the government in power 
NEITI was introduced into the Nigerian regulatory space as part of the anti-corruption reform 
of the then president Olusegun Obasanjo. Shaxson (2009) in his study of NEITI finds that the 
primary motivator for its introduction was the need to enhance the countries international 
reputation thus enabling the government to achieve its debt restructuring deal with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international creditors (Asgill, 2012). At the 
time, NEITI was given all the support it needed to function effectively. However, once debt 
restructuring was achieved, the reforms began to falter and NEITI and its audit reports were 
relegated to the sidelines (Muller, 2011). Two subsequent governments led by President 
Yaradua and President Johnathan did not back the anti-corruption reforms and so NEITI did 
not achieve much during their tenures. However, the current President, Muhammadu Buhari 
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has sought to reintroduce anti-corruption reforms and has empowered NEITI to act on its 
mandate. The NEITI Executive Secretary responding to a question in a media interview on 
how much influence the government wields on NEITI, comments: 
“a lot….. A lot in the sense that everything rises and falls on political 
will. If you do your reports and you make tons of recommendations, and 
the government does not have the appetite to push through or does not 
have the will to push through, then you are just doing your audit 
report….. Political will is very critical …… what of if the government 
is not interested in transparency, what of if the government is not 
interested in reforms…. Political will is not a given, it is not something 
that any government owes anybody”. (Channels TV Interview B) 
Indeed, the absence of political will is not just characterised by the lack of willingness to 
follow through on audit recommendations but an active protection of the corrupt individuals 
and organisations which empowers them to challenge the NEITI audit reports even when they 
know that their challenge is unfounded. This is highlighted by the NEITI Executive 
Secretary’s comment to the press on the NNPCs response to the most recent audit report 
published during President Buhari’s tenure: 
“If you notice this year, NNPC or its subsidiaries have not come out to 
say, all those allegations you are making, they are wrong, because they 
know that they do not have the protection. If NNPC operated the way 
they operated in the past, it is because it served the interests of some 
people for it to be so and there was an institutional cover for what they 
did …” (News Agency of Nigeria TV Interview) 
Thus, the political will of the government in power is a key mediator of the impact which the 
NEITI transparency process has both in terms of the acceptance of NEITIs reports and the 
use to which the reports are put. Indeed, the ability of NEITI audit reports to drive change in 
agencies like NNPC in terms of increased accountability and reduced corruption depends on 
how much ‘protection’ these government agencies receive from the government in power. 
5.3.2 Constitution and independence of the NSWG 
The NSWG is the board of NEITI which is responsible for the formulation of its policies, 
programmes and strategies. Section 6 of the NEITI Act provides that the President shall have 
the power to appoint and remove the members of the NSWG who shall consist of a 
Chairman, the NEITI Executive Secretary, one representative from civil society, one 
representative from the labour unions in the extractive industry, one representative of 
extractive industries companies, experts in the extractive industry and one representative 
from each of the countries six geo-political zones. While the Act stipulates the constituencies 
from which the members of the NSWG should be drawn, it does not stipulate how they are 
chosen. This leave the President with absolute discretion to choose representatives based on 
political as opposed to technical considerations.  
Even if the representatives from the extractive industry companies, civil society and labour 
unions were nominated by their constituencies, they make up only three out of the 15 
members of the NSWG. Indeed, the practice by the government has been to appoint NSWG 
members who have significant ties to the government or the ruling political party. This was 
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highlighted by a civil society leader commenting on the dissolution of the NSWG by the 
Buhari government when it came into office: 
“most members of the dissolved NEITI Board were card-carrying 
members of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), with little or no 
interest on EITI/NEITI … the dissolution was a relief to most Nigerians, 
as the Board not only lost its independence, neutrality and moral right, 
but also lacked the trust to perform its role….	with the outcome of the 
March 28, 2015 elections in which the PDP was defeated, the popular 
expectation was that most members of the Board would have resigned, 
in view of their open partisanship, particularly against the issue of total 
overhaul and reforms in the oil sector. (Udo, 2015) 
While a lot of hope was held out for the appointment of a new and independent NSWG by the 
Buhari government, it in fact went further than previous governments in trying to bring the 
NSWG under its control. It appointed the government minister for solid minerals as the NEITI 
Chair, a position usually held by a civil society activist and it sought to appoint the civil society 
representative without consulting with civil society organisations. The composition and lack of 
independence of the NSWG have fuelled the perception of the NSWG having nothing at stake 
in the fight against corruption with a civil society activist noting: 
“NEITI is a government agency and if you are a government agency 
in Nigeria, you must dance to the tune of the government” (civil 
society activist quoted in Abutudu and Garuba, 2010 pp.52) 
This domination of the NSWG by the government has led to a distrust of both the 
government and the NSWG by civil society as illustrated by their rejection of the civil society 
representative on the NSWG appointed by the government: 
"We wish to state that we find the announcement disruptive, 
prejudicial to the on-going process and in bad faith. It is pertinent to 
ask at this juncture: When did the process that produced Kola Banwo 
as CSO representative begin and end? What procedure did it follow? 
Which CSOs participated in that process? Did it reflect the EITI's 
principle of transparency? Does the appointment of Kola Banwo meet 
the provisions of the EITI Standard and more specifically, its CSO 
Protocol? ……. We therefore wish to state that the surreptitious 
character of this announcement of Banwo as CSO representative 
makes a mockery of the EITI Principles and flies in the face of the 
intrinsic values of the constituency he seeks to represent." (statement 
by coalition of civil society organisations quoted in Olayinka, 2016) 
In addition, the NSWGs lack of independence raises questions about the ability of NEITI to 
function effectively as an instrument of transparency as it is the NSWG which determines the 
scope, quality and timing of audit reports. 
5.3.3 The touch-bearer – NEITI as an institution 
While the literature which views transparency as a light shining in the darkness focuses on 
the opacity of an actor (state and corporations) and the light (information disclosure) which 
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dispels the darkness, no attention is paid to the instruments by which the light is shone. In our 
case, directing the light at the instrument of transparency (NEITI) produces some interesting 
results. 
5.3.3.1 Corruption within NEITI 
The NEITI Secretariat has six departments with about 50 staff and is headed by the NEITI 
Executive Secretary. When the secretariat was set up initially, its staff was mostly made up of 
civil servants who were deployed to NEITI from other ministries. Commenting on this, 
Muller (2011, pp. 80) notes that: 
“mostly, the deployment is actually based on politics, nepotism, 
favouritism and all of that” 
Given the corrupt nature of deployment of staff to NEITI, it was not long before allegations 
of financial corruption within the NEITI bureaucracy began to surface. In 2010 allegations 
surfaced that the NEITI Director of Services was accused of over-invoicing and making 
unauthorised payments to hotels in respect of a NEITI organised civil society training 
programme to the tune of $100,000 (Udo, 2010). The matter was referred to the NEITI board 
and disciplinary action was taken against the Director. Also, a commitment was made to 
restructure the NEITI secretariat. A few months later, the Executive Secretary was accused of 
corruption and abuse of office in a series of petitions and public letters to the President. He 
was replaced by the President before investigations into these allegations could take place 
(Goxi, 2010). Whether true or false, the allegations of corruption within NEITI damaged the 
organisations reputation both locally and internationally. The Revenue Watch Institute’s 
Nigeria representative noted at a book launch on NEITI: 
“I have been engaged with EITI issues with my New York office in the 
past two weeks …. At every point, the development in the NEITI 
Secretariat keeps recurring. As a global initiative that Nigeria 
convincingly led since inception, it is a pity to know of the allegations 
of corruption within NEITI Secretariat. This is particularly intriguing 
because it touches the very reasons for which NEITI was set up.” 
(Speech by Dauda Garuba) 
While the NEITI board claims to have reorganised the Secretariat after these incidents, the 
stigma and distrust arising from them still linger (Abutudu and Garuba, 2010). 
 
5.3.3.2  Opacity of NEITI 
The Global EITI as part of the EITI Standard has developed an EITI openness policy which 
sets out how EITI itself should be transparent. While this policy states that documents of EITI 
are public and should be accessible to the public, it exempts internal documents from the 
access. However, it goes on to state that EITI board minutes, as well as committee and 
working group minutes, are not regarded as internal documents. 
Although the Global EITI has complied with this openness policy by publishing minutes of 
its board, committee and working group meetings, in Nigeria, NEITI has not published 
minutes of any board, committee or working groups. In addition to not publishing minutes, it 
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shrouds its operations in secrecy by placing limits on the ability of staff and board members 
to discuss the operations of the organisation with outsiders. Indeed, current and previous 
board members refused to grant our research team interviews citing confidentiality 
agreements entered into with NEITI. 
Thus, while ‘lifting the veil’ in the extractive industry, NEITI as an organisation had 
developed its own forms of closures to ensure that its own curtains remain shut to outsiders. 
This closure, coupled with the effect of the corruption allegations on its reputation serve to 
create doubt, uncertainty and mistrust in the minds of NEITI’s target audience and partners. 
 
6 Discussion 
At the end of Section 3 we concluded that: 
i. Transparency entails shining light on objects and making them visible. However, in 
making the invisible visible, it conceals other things. 
ii. Transparency can be viewed as a process and as comprising institutional relations 
which can be analysed in terms of subjects, setting, rules, interactions, power, etc. 
iii. Transparency is seen as information disclosure. However, the information disclosed 
has to be useful and the public and civil society have to be able to use the information 
disclosed. 
iv. Transparency can have unintended consequences. 
Based on this understanding of transparency, we set out to problematize NEITI as a public 
sector transparency and anti-corruption initiative in Nigeria by ‘interrogating’ its underlying 
assumptions that transparency in the form of increased information disclosure leads to 
enhanced accountability and reduced corruption. Figures 2 provides a visual representation of 
our findings: 




We show that while EITI adoption in Nigeria and NEITI have driven increased information 
disclosure by both the government and companies operating in the extractive industry, 
increased information disclosure through the NEITI audit reports has not led to enhanced 
accountability and a reduction in corruption as envisaged by EITI and NEITI. Quite to the 
contrary, increased information disclosure through NEITI audit reports has had the 
unintended consequence of entrenching inefficient and corrupt systems, creating distrust 
between civil society organisations and the government as well as permitting 
unaccountability in the extractive industry. These unintended consequences result from the 
complex social dynamic of the NEITI process where NEITI far from being a neutral actor is 
controlled by the government in power whose will to enact reform also determines the 
behavioural impact NEITI audit reports have on actors in the extractive industry. The 
centrality of NEITI as an organisation in this social process is highlighted as civil society’s 
perception of government control of the NEITI organisation, its reputation for internal 
corruption as well as its opacity as an organisation are significant factors in the trust 
relationship between civil society and NEITI. These coupled with the incomprehensibility of 
the audit reports to most of the NEITI target audience, lateness in publishing audit reports as 
well as the audit reports unfaithful representation of information, have resulted in the limited 
use of NEITI audit reports in holding actors in the extractive industry to account. Thus, 
NEITI far from being a solution to the problem of accountability and corruption in Nigeria 
has become part of the problem. Indeed, while research on EITI and NEITI has emphasised 
their institutionalisation and efficacy as a solution to corruption, we present an alternative and 
more critical perspective of these transparency bodies and their relationship with 
accountability and corruption. We encourage future researchers to adopt similar critical 
perspective in investigating EITI and NEITI. 
Beyond the problematisation of NEITI, our findings contribute to the theoretic understanding 
of transparency as they present a more nuanced view of transparency both as information 
disclosure and as a process. In relation to the narrow view of transparency as information 
disclosure (Bushman et al., 2004; Eijffinger and Geraats, 2006; Wehmeier and Raaz, 2012; 
Berglund, 2014), they reinforce the arguments in the literature that transparency in this form 
requires a full and timely disclosure of all relevant information (Berglund, 2014). In addition, 
they show that the usefulness of the information disclosed is linked strongly to the 
understandability of the information by its target audience. Thus, we argue that an additional 
requirement of transparency as information disclosure is the understandability of information 
disclosed. In relation to transparency as a process (Meijer, 2013; Flyverbom et al., 2011; Abu 
and Flyverbom, 2016; Albu, 2014; Thedvall, 2008), our findings emphasise the view in the 
literature of transparency as a complex social process which sometimes has unintended 
consequences (Tsoukas, 1997; Strathern, 2000; Eisenberg, 2007; Christensen and Langer, 
2009). However, they go on to extend the view in the literature of transparency as involving 
‘actors’ and ‘light’ by highlighting the central role which the instrument by which light is 
shone plays in the transparency process. Indeed, we show that no matter how bright the light 
shone, it is the hand carrying the light which directs its beams and which actors need to trust 
as being neutral and itself accountable, free from opacity and corruption. Thus, as in our case 
with NEITI, where an organisation is the instrument through which transparency is enacted, 
that organisation itself has to be transparent and seen to be so. 
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In addition to contributing to the theoretic understanding of transparency, our findings have 
implications for policy and policy development. Our findings have shown that the Nigerian 
context has influenced the manner in which the EITI was implemented in Nigeria. This has 
led to consequences not intended by the EITI. The lesson here relates to the development of 
global policies intended for implementation locally. In designing such policies, consideration 
has to be given to how these will be shaped by local contexts and provisions have to be made 
which enable these policies to adapt to the local context without losing their efficacy. In our 
case, concrete suggestions to limit the manner in which the local context influences the 
implementation of the EITI include: amending the EITI policies to allow the local 
implementing agency more flexibility in its methods relating to data collection; the EITI 
framework being amended to guarantee greater independence of the local implementing 
agency from the government in terms of control over funding, governance and operational 
activities; and requiring adopting governments to strengthen the local implementing agency’s 
powers to follow up on audit findings. 
Also important are the implications of our findings for practice. Our findings highlight the 
importance of transparency and accountability within the implementing agency (NEITI). 
While the policy framework which should ensure this transparency exists, NEITI does not 
adhere to these policies. To ensure that these policies are adhered to, internal governance of 
NEITI needs to be strengthened and the EITI needs to either ensure greater control over 
NEITI operations or exert significant and sustained pressure on NEITI to ensure compliance. 
Indeed, these findings in terms of internal transparency and accountability are also relevant to 
other Supreme Audit Institutions across a variety of industries and sectors. 
  
7 Conclusion 
“that more knowledge could cause problems, that light might prove 
another tyranny, that knowledge might bring suffering, were not 
thoughts the philosophers of the Enlightenment were prepared to 
entertain”. (Tsoukas, 1997, pp. 839) 
We set out to problematise NEITI as a transparency, accountability and anti-corruption 
initiative by ‘interrogating’ its underlying assumptions that transparency in the form of 
increased information disclosure leads to enhanced accountability and reduced corruption. To 
do this, we drew on insights from the transparency literature which view transparency both as 
information disclosure underpinned by a linear communication model and as a social process. 
We also drew on insights from the IASB Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting in 
developing our understanding of what useful information is. 
In studies such as this, it is customary to acknowledge and reflect on the limitations of the 
study. Chief amongst the limitations was the paucity of primary data. This was the case as 
several members of civil society, staff of government agencies as well as NEITI staff and 
board members (past and present) refused to grant interviews to the research team. 
Consequently, we conducted the study by drawing on a wide range of secondary sources 
which included media articles and reports, civil society reports, NEITI press releases as well 
as media interviews, presentations and testimony before the legislative house by civil society 
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actors, NEITI staff and board members. This enabled us to gather a rich pool of data on 
which the study is based. 
In spite of the limitations, our study makes significant contributions to the transparency and 
EITI literature in a number of ways. First, we highlight how the accountability function of 
NEITI has been eroded as the global EITI was translated to fit in with local systems and 
cultures and how indeed it has moved from being a solution to the problems of transparency, 
accountability and corruption in Nigeria to being part of the problem. Second, we show the 
unintended consequences of adopting a view of transparency as information disclosure 
without regard to how the information was produced. We did this by highlighting how 
increased information disclosure through NEITI audit reports legitimised the weak and 
corrupt reporting systems and practices of government agencies which provide NEITI with 
the information on which it bases its audit report. Third, we draw attention to the importance 
of understandability of information disclosed as a key requirement of transparency by 
showing how audit reports are ignored by the public because they are largely unintelligible. 
We also illustrate the complexity of transparency as a social process by highlighting the 
power struggles for the control of the NEITI organisation and how NEITI’s ability to operate 
effectively is dependent on the political will of the government in power. Finally, we 
underscore the importance of the instrument through which transparency is enacted as a 
central actor in the transparency process. We do this by illustrating how historical corruption 
within the NEITI bureaucracy as well as the opacity of NEITI as an organisation lead to 
outcomes of distrust, uncertainty and doubt amongst NEITIs target audience. These 
contributions enable a more nuanced understanding of transparency – where and when 
transparency works, and where and when it may lead to unintended outcomes. Indeed, they 
enable us better understand the darker side of transparency and the links between 
transparency, accountability and corruption. 
We hope that our study opens up a space within the accounting and public administration 
fields to more actively ‘interrogate’ the assumptions which underpin the EITI and its 
adoption in resource rich countries. Of particular importance is the need for future research to 
investigate the process through which the EITI is implemented and the effect the local 
context has on EITI adoption and implementation. This should enable a better understanding 
of what transparency is and the conditions under which EITI adoption can lead to increased 
transparency, accountability and reduced corruption. We encourage future researchers to 
apply a similar critical lens in analysing the role of Supreme Audit Institutions in other 
sectors and industries, especially the nuanced and complex role these institutions may play in 
helping or hindering transparency, accountability and corruption controls.  	 	
23	
	
Appendix 1 – EITI principles (EITI 2016c) 
1. We share a belief that the prudent use of natural resource wealth should be an 
important engine for sustainable economic growth that contributes to sustainable 
development and poverty reduction, but if not managed properly, can create negative 
economic and social impacts. 
  
2. We affirm that management of natural resource wealth for the benefit of a country’s 
citizens is in the domain of sovereign governments to be exercised in the interest of 
their national development. 
  
3. We recognise that the benefits of resource extraction occur as revenue streams over 
many years and can be highly price dependent. 
  
4. We recognise that a public understanding of government revenues and expenditure 
over time could help public debate and inform choice of appropriate and realistic 
options for sustainable development. 
  
5. We underline the importance of transparency by governments and companies in the 
extractive industries and the need to enhance public financial management and 
accountability. 
  
6. We recognise that achievement of greater transparency must be set in the context of 
respect for contracts and laws. 
  
7. We recognise the enhanced environment for domestic and foreign direct investment 
that financial transparency may bring. 
  
8. We believe in the principle and practice of accountability by government to all 
citizens for the stewardship of revenue streams and public expenditure. 
  
9. We are committed to encouraging high standards of transparency and accountability 
in public life, government operations and in business. 
  
10. We believe that a broadly consistent and workable approach to the disclosure of 
payments and revenues is required, which is simple to undertake and to use. 
  
11. We believe that payments’ disclosure in a given country should involve all extractive 




12. In seeking solutions, we believe that all stakeholders have important and relevant 
contributions to make – including governments and their agencies, extractive industry 
companies, service companies, multilateral organisations, financial organisations, 





Appendix 2 – EITI requirements (EITI, 2006c) 
 
i. Oversight by an effective multi-stakeholder group which involves the government, 
companies, and the full, independent, active and effective participation of civil society 
 
ii. Full disclosure of information relating to the legal and institutional framework which 
regulates the extractive industry including the allocation of contracts and licences 
 
 
iii. Full disclosure relating to exploration and production of oil, gas and mineral resources  
 
iv. Full disclosure of company payments and government revenue from the extractive 
industries. These are required to be independently reconciled 
 
 
v. Full disclosures of information related to revenue allocations, enabling stakeholders to 
understand how revenues are recorded in the national and where applicable, 
subnational budgets 
 
vi. Full disclosures of information related to social expenditures and the impact of the 
extractive sector on the economy 
 
vii. Ensuring outcomes and impact 
 
viii. Compliance with deadlines. 
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Appendix 3 – List of actors referred to and their relationship with NEITI 
Actor Description 
Global EITI The Global EITI evaluates countries' performance in reaching the requirements 
of the EITI Standard rewarding or sanctioning countries’ as appropriate. It has 
very little direct control over the operations of the national implementing 
agencies i.e. NEITI in our case. 
NEITI This is the Nigerian organisation which implements the EITI framework in 





The NSWG is the governing body of NEITI. It acts much like a Board of 
Directors and its roles include: formulating policies, programmes and 
strategies; approving budgets and work-plans; overseeing the operations of the 
organisation; commissioning and approving NEITI audits. Its members are 
appointed by the Nigerian President in accordance with the NEITI Act. 
NEITI 
Chairperson 
The Chair of the NEITI NSWG. The Chair much like the Chair of a Board of 
Directors has no executive powers. 
NEITI Executive 
Secretary 
The Chief Executive Officer of NEITI. The Executive Secretary is appointed 
by the Nigerian President and serves as Secretary to the NSWG. 
Civil Society 
Organisations 
Civil society organisations work with NEITI as stakeholders in the governance 
of the oil and gas industry in Nigeria. The NEITI Act requires one member of 






NNPC is the National oil company. It manages the Nigerian governments stake 
in all joint venture production agreements in the oil and gas industry. It 




DPR is statutorily responsible for ensuring compliance with petroleum laws, 
regulations and guidelines in the Oil and Gas Industry. In this capacity it 
regulates the activities of NNPC and other companies operating in the oil and 
gas industry in Nigeria. 
Ministry of 
Finance 
The Ministry of Finance is the government ministry that manages the finances 
of the Nigerian government. Its role includes managing, controlling and 
monitoring oil and gas revenues and expenditures. 
Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN) 
CBN is the reserve bank and monetary authority in Nigeria. It manages the 
countries external reserve. Oil revenues are meant to be remitted from NNPC 





The Nigerian President is the head of state and head of government of Nigeria. 
The NEITI Act gives the President the power to appoint member of the NSWG 
and Executive Secretary. Since inception of NEITI in 2004, Nigeria has been 
ruled by four Presidents. 
 
• President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999 – 2007): Brought the EITI and 
NEITI to Nigeria as part of his anti-corruption reforms. Supported NEITI 
for most part of his tenure. 
• President Musa Yaradua (2007 – 2010): Succeeded President Obasanjo. 
Was not really interested in anti-corruption reforms so did not give NEITI 
much support. 
• President Goodluck Johnathan (2010 – 2015): Succeeded President 
Yaradua. Was not interested in anti-corruption reforms and so did not 
give NEITI much support. 
• President Muhammadu Buhari (2015 – present): Succeeded President 
Johnathan. President Buhari’s major campaign promise was to fight 






NEITI target audience include the government, parliamentarians, civil society, 
companies, the media and the Nigerian public. This target audience is meant to 




These are companies who participate in the oil and gas industry in Nigeria. 
These include multinationals like Royal Dutch Shell, Agip, ExxonMobil, Total 
S.A, Chevron all of whom have joint venture operations with the Nigerian 




Appendix 4 – Data sources referred to in the text 
In Text Reference Data Source 
Channels TV Interview 
a 
Hard Copy: Waziri Adio Gives Reasons For Late Publishing Of NEITI's 
Report, Channels TV interview with NEITI Executive Secretary.  
EITI Guidance Note 12 Guidance Note 12 on Summary EITI Report, EITI 
Presentation by NEITI 
Executive Secretary to 
IMF Mission on 21 
March 2012 
NEITI: The Prospects, Issues and Challenges, Presentation by NEITI Executive 
Secretary to IMF Mission on 21 March 2012 
Onwuemenyi (2012) Fuel subsidy scandal and NEITI audit reports. Vanguard Newspaper August 7, 
2012. 
IASB (2010) International Accounting Standards Board. (2010). The Conceptual Framework 
for Financial Reporting 2010. IFRS. 
NEITI 2016 oil and gas 
audit report 
NEITI 2016 oil and gas audit report 
US Embassy Cables 
Leak, Wikileaks Cable 
09LAGOS438_a 
Fundamentals of Illegal Oil Bunkering In Nigeria, Cable from US Consulate in 
Lagos, Nigeria. 18 Nov 2009 obtained from WikiLeaks 
NEITI Report 10 years of NEITI reports : what have we learnt? NEITI 
 
EITI (2016c) The EITI standard. Oslo: EITI International Secretariat. 
PwC (2015) Investigative Forensic Audit into the Allegations of Unremitted Funds into the 
Federation Accounts by the NNPC, PricewaterhouseCoopers, February 2015. 
NEITI 2013 Oil and 
Gas Audit Report 
NEITI 2013 Oil and Gas Audit Report 
Shaxson (2009) Shaxson, N. (2009). Nigeria’s Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative: 
Just a Glorious Audit? London: Chatham House (Royal Institute of 
International Affairs) 
Channels TV Interview 
b 
Hard Copy: More Still Need To Be Done On Transparency In The Extractive 
Industry - Waziri Adio, Channels TV interview with NEITI Executive Secretary  
News Agency of 
Nigeria TV Interview 
NNPC can not refute our claims, says NEITI, News Agency of Nigeria TV 
interview with NEITI Executive Secretary  
Udo (2015) Transparency agency commences self-cleansing | Nigeria Content Online. 
Available at http://nigeriang.com/money/transparency-agency-commences-self-
cleansing-2/4874/ 
Abutudu and Garuba 
(2010) 
Natural Resource Governance and EITI Implementation in Nigeria. Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet. 
Olayinka (2016) Nigeria: Coalition Lauds Buhari On NEITI Board, Faults Nomination Process. 
Available at http://allafrica.com/stories/201604280098.html  
Muller (2011) Turning the curse into a blessing: A convenient Illusion. Lessons from the 
Nigerian EITI process. In J. Runge & J. Shikwati (Eds.), Geological Resources 
and Good Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa: Holistic Approaches to 
Transparency and Sustainable Development in the Extractive Sector (pp. 69–
88). Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press 
Speech by Dauda 
Garuba 
Speech by Dauda Garuba at the Public Presentation of a Book on Performance 




Appendix 5 – Other data sources 
Document Type Description Number of 
Reports 
NEITI Oil and 
Gas Audit 
Reports 
Financial, Physical and Process Audit Reports for the periods: 1999 – 




Activity Reports to EITI in 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016 5 
NEITI Strategic 
Plan 




NEITI Communication strategy document 1 
MSWG 
Membership 
MSWG Membership list: 2008 – 2012; 2012 – 2015; 2016 3 
NEITI Act Legislative enactment 1 
NEITI Open 
Audit Magazine 
NEITI magazine targeted at the public: June 2011 – Feb 2017 14 
NEITI policy 
brief 





NEITI newsletter to staff: January 2016 – May 2017 10 
NEITI 
Workplan 
NEITI annual workplans approved by MSWG: 2009 - 2018 12 
NEITI Quarterly 
Review 








NEITI papers aimed at shaping policy debate 2 
Civil Society in 
NEITI Process 
Report on NEITI engagement with civil society 1 
Civil Society 
publications 
Reports, blogs and other publications on NEITI and its operations by 
civil society organisations including Chatham House. 
20 
10 Years of 
NEITI report 
NEITI reflections on lessons learnt from 10 years of reporting 2 
NEITI HR 
Documents 





NEITI press releases on NEITI website 225 
KPMG and 
PwC reports 
Reports of forensic audits of NNPC carried out by KPMG and PwC 2 
Videos on 
NEITI website 
Videos of interviews and presentations made by the EITI Executive 
Secretary 
8 
Other Videos Videos aired on Nigerian Television. These include interviews with 
the NEITI Executive Secretary and other NEITI officials, interviews 
with government officials which discuss NEITI, reports on NEITI 
and its work, etc.   
45 
Wikileaks US Embassy in Nigeria cable communication leaked by Wikileaks. 
These are cables sent from the US Mission in Lagos and Embassy in 




and gas sector in Nigeria. Initial search yielded 2,561 results of which 




News reports about NEITI in the Nigerian and global press obtained 
from the Nexis database. Initial search yielded 4,578 results of which 
2,425 were deemed relevant. 
2,425 
EITI Standard EITI Standards and revisions thereof. 2 
EITI Guidance 
Notes 
Guidance notes on aspects of the EITI Standard and other related 




EITI website country page for Nigeria 1 
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